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THE TECHNOLOGICAL SNIFFING OUT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: ASSESSING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PASSIVE
ALCOHOL SENSOR III
Kim Han*

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees to each person, in the United States, the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.' In determining what
constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court has developed a two-prong analysis based on reasonable
subjective expectations of privacy.2 The recent advent of sense
enhancing technology has increasingly enabled law enforcement
officials to conduct "searches" that have been held to be constitutional because they did not constitute "searches" under the Fourth
Amendment.' One of the current tools being used in the war

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; B.A. New York University, 1997.
The author wishes to thank her family and friends for their patience and support.
' See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
2 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the
monitoring of beeper signals from a radio transmitter placed on the defendant's
vehicle did not constitute a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that the use of a pen register
by a telephone company did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
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against drunk driving is an instrument known as the Passive
Alcohol Sensor III ("P.A.S. III") or the "Sniffer."4 This tool acts
as a breathalyzer and is used without the driver's knowledge or
consent.5 Presently, there is no case law addressing the constitutionality of the use of the P.A.S. 111.6
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of the use of the P.A.S.
III and argues that the use of this tool should constitute a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment. It further argues that the use of the
Sniffer is an unreasonable search that implicates the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 7 Since the use of the Sniffer
has implications for both Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, there
should be specific protocols followed in conjunction with its use.
Part I of this Note provides background on the seminal and
applicable search and seizure cases, the primary cases on the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, as well as the P.A.S.
III. Part II of this Note analyzes the constitutionality of the use of
the Sniffer and argues that the use of the Sniffer should be ruled
unconstitutional. The Sniffer invades the privacy of the interior of
the car in an attempt to detect something that is otherwise undetectable. As such, it should be considered an unreasonable invasion of
privacy. However, under the current stream of case law, it is
unlikely that the use of the Sniffer will be considered unconstitu-

Amendment); United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 121 S.Ct. 29 (2000) (No. 99-8508) (holding that a thermal image scan
did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment). The Supreme Court
is set to decide the Kyllo case this term. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part
I.A. L.b.
4 The P.A.S. III appears to be an ordinary flashlight but is actually equipped
with a sensor that detects alcohol. PAS Systems International:P.A.S. III Sniffer,
at http://www.sniffalcohol.com/prod0l.htm, (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
5 Id.
6 However, there does seem to be an unreported ruling in the District of
Columbia upholding the Sniffer's reliability. Mary P. Gallagher, Civil Libertarians Wince at New Device that 'Shines Light' on Drunken Drivers, N.J. L.J., Aug.
21, 2000.
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part,
provides that "[n]o person shall be ...compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Id.
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tional. Part I also provides a policy analysis on the use of the
Sniffer. The final part of this Note suggests some guidelines that
should be implemented in conjunction with the use of the Sniffer.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Case Law
1. Fourth Amendment Freedom from
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The early interpretations by the Supreme Court of the United
States of whether there had been an unreasonable search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment focused on a strict trespass of
property approach. 8 Thus, for example, in Olmstead v. United
States, the Court found that a surveillance without any trespass and
without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of
the Constitution.9 In Olmstead, the defendants' conversations were
intercepted through a wiretap of the defendants' office as well as
several of their residences.' ° The intercepted conversations were
subsequently used against the defendants in court. The phones
were tapped by the insertion of small wires along regular telephone
lines and was done without any physical trespass on the defendants' property. 12 Reasoning that the wires were not part of the
defendants' houses or office and that the evidence was secured by
the use of the sense of hearing, the Court held that there was
neither a search nor a seizure.' 3 The Court found that since the
Fourth Amendment only applied to the search or seizure of
material things, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. 4

' See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9 277 U.S. at 464.
1oId. at 457.
11Id.
12 Id.
13Id. at 464.
14Id. at 464-66.
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In its seminal decision of Katz v. United States, the Supreme
Court redefined and expanded what constitutes a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment. 15 In Katz, the Court ruled that in order for a
search to be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
it must pass muster under a two-pronged analysis. 16 First, there
must be a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy on the part
of the defendant. 7 Second, this expectation of privacy must be
one that society is willing to recognize.' 8 Utilizing this two-prong
criteria, the Supreme Court has determined that actions such as the
use of a beeper by police to monitor the movement of a car,'9 and
the use of a dog by police to attempt to sniff out drugs did not
amount to violations of the Fourth Amendment because they did
not constitute searches.2 °
In determining the reasonableness of a search, one consideration
is the location of the search itself.2 ' For example, the Supreme
Court has recognized an increased expectation of privacy rights
where the location being searched is a home.22 Thus, in Payton v.
New York, where police officers broke into the defendant's
apartment without obtaining a warrant, the Court ruled that the
15 389
16

U.S. 347 (1967).

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). This two-prong test was formulated in

Justice Harlan's concurrence and not the majority opinion. Id. The majority
opinion merely defined what was protected under the Fourth Amendment, that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id. at 351.
17 Id.

id.
"9United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276. The Court held that the monitoring
of a signal did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on the
defendant's part. The defendant was the owner of the cabin that was the final
destination of the car being monitored. Id.
20 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that the exposure
of luggage to a trained narcotics dog does not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment).
21 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect:
Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 331-34 (1998)
(discussing the hierarchy of privacy interests created by the Supreme Court).
22 See e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) ("The Fourth
Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is
the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous
physical dimensions of an individual's home.").
18

FOURTH AMENDMENT

entry into the home, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.23 Similarly, in
Welsh v. Wisconsin, where the police entered the defendant's house
and arrested him for driving while intoxicated, the Court held that
the warrantless entry was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.24
Therefore, at least with respect to homes, the Court has found that
there needs to be either a warrant or an exigent circumstance
before the privacy of an individual's home can be invaded.
a.

Automobiles and Decreasing Expectations of Privacy

Unlike the expectation of privacy in a home, individuals have
diminished Fourth Amendment rights in their automobiles.
Starting with its decision in Carroll v. United States,26 where the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction for transporting alcohol based
on an amendment to the Prohibition Act, 27 the Court began to
recognize a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to
automobiles. Although the alcohol was searched and seized from

23

Id. at 586 ("It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable."); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971)
("It is accepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search or seizure carried
out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the
police can show . . . 'exigent circumstances."').
24

466 U.S. 740 (1984).

25

See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) ("At least since Carroll

v. United States, the Court has recognized a distinction between the warrantless
search and seizure of automobiles or other movable vehicles, on the one hand,
and the search of a home or office, on the other."); see also James A. Adams,
The Supreme Court's Improbable Justifications for Restriction of Citizens'
FourthAmendment PrivacyExpectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 833,
841-45 (1999); Clancy, supra note 21, at 332.
26 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
27 National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (repealed 1933). The
Prohibition Act was passed to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, which
prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcohol within the United
States. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). The Eighteenth Amendment
was subsequently repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI. The Twenty-First Amendment provides: "The eighteenth article of
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed." Id.
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the defendant's automobile without a warrant, the Court noted that
there was a distinction between searching a private dwelling and
searching an automobile or other vehicle.28 Moreover, the Court
held that this distinction was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 29 The Court's reasoning for this distinction between a
vehicle and a dwelling was based on the idea that there may be
exigent circumstances involved with a movable vehicle since
anything concealed in a movable vehicle may be readily moved out
of the reach of a search warrant.3°
Expanding on this line of reasoning, the Court in Cardwell v.
Lewis, found yet another distinction between automobiles and
homes.31 In Cardwell, the defendant had parked his car at a public
parking lot while he was meeting with police officers inside the
stationhouse.32 While the defendant was inside the stationhouse,
several officers removed paint samples from the defendant's car.33
The defendant claimed that the removal of the paint samples from

28

Caroll, 267 U.S. at 147.

29 Id.

Id. at 151. The Carroll court opined as follows:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by
the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and
a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153; see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In Chambers,the
Court ruled the following:
[T]he circumstances that fumish probable cause to search a particular
auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the
opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable ....
Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.
Id. at 50-51.
31 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
31

32
31

Id. at 587.
Id. at 591.
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his car was unconstitutional.34 However, the Court upheld as
reasonable searches the removal of paint samples from the
automobile, as well as the police examination of the car tires.35
The Court reasoned that "[t]he search of an automobile [was] far
less intrusive . . . than the search of one's person or of a build-

ing., 36 Furthermore, the Court noted that there was a lesser
expectation of privacy in an automobile, since its function was as
a means of transportation and not as a home or as "the repository
for personal effects. 37
Following its Cardwell decision, the Court, in United States v.
Knotts, was confronted with the issue of whether the "monitoring
[of] beeper signals ... invaded any legitimate expectation of

privacy. ' ' 38 In Knotts, law enforcement officers arranged to install,
inside a chloroform container, a beeper device that emitted periodic
signals that could be picked up by a radio receiver. 39 This container was then sold to the co-defendant in the case.4 ° Using the
signals, the police followed the car to the defendant's cabin.4 1
After several days of surveillance, a search warrant was executed
that led to the discovery of the chloroform container containing the
beeper as well as a drug laboratory within the cabin.42 Finding
that the use of a beeper to monitor signals and the movement of a
car did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on the part

34 Id.

at 588.

35Id. at 591-92.
36

Id. at 590 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
37 Id. However, even where the vehicle is used as a home, the Court has still
found a diminished expectation of privacy. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386 (1985) (recognizing that the mobile home possessed many of the attributes
of a home but refusing to distinguish and recognize a greater expectation of
privacy). "To distinguish between respondent's motor home and an ordinary
sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would require that we apply the
exception depending upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its
appointments." Id. at 393.
" 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
'9 Id. at 277.
40 id.
41 id.
42 Id. at 279.
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of the defendant,43 the Court held that there was neither a search
nor a seizure, and, therefore, no constitutional issue.44 Reinforcing
its plurality opinion in Cardwell v. Lewis, 45 the Court also reasoned that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
46
movements from one place to another.,
With its decisions in Cardwell and Knotts, the Supreme Court
further eroded the expectation of privacy an individual enjoys in
his or her automobile. Continuing along this tenuous path, the
Court ruled, in United States v. Ross, that the police could conduct
a warrantless search of a vehicle that was believed to contain
narcotics. 47 Finding that "the privacy interests in a car's trunk or
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable
container, ' 48 such as luggage, the Court nevertheless held that "an
individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents
may not survive if [there is] probable cause ... to believe that the
49

vehicle is transporting contraband.,
In the recent case of Wyoming v. Houghton, the Court scaled
back the already diminished expectation of privacy even further by
holding that police officers who have probable cause to search a
car may inspect a passenger's belongings contained in the car if
those belongings are capable of concealing the object of the
search.5° In Houghton, the Court assessed the reasonableness of

41 Id.

at 285. While the beeper in the car led the police to the defendant's
cabin, the defendant was not the driver of the car. Id. at 278.
44Id. at
4' 417

285.

U.S. at 590 (holding that the search of an automobile was "far less
intrusive" than the search of one's home).
46 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
47456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
48

Id. at 823.

49 Id.
50 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999). In Houghton, the police had stopped a car for
several traffic infractions. Id. at 297. Upon questioning the driver, the officer
noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver's shirt pocket. Id. at 298. The driver
admitted to using drugs which, in turn, led to a search of the car for contraband.
Id. Among the objects searched was defendant's purse, which was located on the
back seat of the car. Id.
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the search of the passenger's effects by applying a balancing
test.5 ' Weighing "the degree to which [the search] intrude[d] on
an individual's privacy" with "the degree to which [the search was]
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests, ' '52
the Court found that the passenger's privacy expectations were
"considerably diminished" whereas the governmental interests were
substantial.53 Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens, however,
noted that the majority was fashioning a new rule by allowing a
search of the passenger's container where the information prompting the search implicated only the driver.54 Arguing that the
majority's rights restrictive approach was not dictated by precedent,
Justice Stevens found that the privacy concerns at issue in this case
were not outweighed by the State's interest in effective law
enforcement.55 Finding unpersuasive the argument that the spatial
association between the passenger and driver was sufficient to
either presume that they were partners in crime or ignore privacy
interests in a purse, Justice Stevens further argued that at the very
least, probable cause to believe that the purse contained contraband
was required prior to the search.56
The Court's abrogation of Fourth Amendment rights in
automobiles is not limited to searches alone - it applies to seizures
as well.57 Unlike a search, a seizure does not rely on expectations
of privacy. Instead, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only
"when there is a governmental termination of freedom of move58
ment through means intentionally applied.
The Court's diminution of the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizures can be seen in the line of cases in which the
"1Id. at 300.
52 Id.

I at 304.
ld.
5 Id. at 309-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 310-11.
56 Id.

" See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding sobriety checkpoints
constitutional); see also Lisa K. Coleman, California v. Acevedo: The Erosion
of the Fourth Amendment Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches, 22
MEMPHIS ST. UNIv. L. REV. 831 (1992) (suggesting that the Court's automobile
cases have resulted in an erosion of Fourth Amendment rights).
58 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
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Court had to rule on the constitutionality of checkpoints.59 For
example, in Michigan v. Sitz,6 ° the Court held that sobriety
checkpoints were constitutional by applying a balancing test that it
had previously used only in determining the constitutionality of
stops with respect to border checkpoints. 6' Agreeing that a seizure
occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint, the Court
reasoned that the issue was whether the search was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 62 Balancing the state's interest in
public safety against the intrusion into an individual's privacy, the
Court found that the state's interest outweighed the slight intrusion
on a motorist stopped briefly at a sobriety checkpoint.63
In a dissenting opinion, however, Justices Brennan and
Marshall, noted that the majority had incorrectly applied the
balancing test by "undervaluing the nature of the intrusion and
exaggerating the law enforcement need to use the roadblocks to
prevent drunken driving." 64 In addition, they noted that the
balancing test should only be applied where "a seizure is substantially less intrusive than a typical arrest. 6 5 Thus, according to the

dissent, the majority's holding subjected the general public to the
possibility of "arbitrary or harassing conduct by the police. 6 6
59See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (ruling on the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (ruling on
the constitutionality of illegal alien checkpoints).
60 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
61See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that vehicle stops at
a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants, even without reason to
believe that the vehicle contained illegal aliens did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
62

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.

63 Id. at 455. "[T]he balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken
driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that
interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly
stopped, weighs in favor of the state program." Id.
4 Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65

Id.

at 457.

66 Id. at 458; see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning the reasonableness of checkpoints). Justice
Thomas writes:
Taken together, our decisions in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, stand for the proposition that
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In the recent case of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme
Court was again faced with the issue of the constitutionality of
checkpoints.67 This time, however, the Court had to decide on the
constitutionality of setting up narcotics interdiction checkpoints.68
Although reaffirming the test utilized in Sitz, which balanced the
competing interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program,
the Court held that where the primary purpose of the checkpoint
was to detect evidence of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the
program contravenes the Fourth Amendment. ' ' 69 As such, these
stops could "only be justified by some quantum of individualized
suspicion., 70 The Court distinguished sobriety checkpoints from
these drug interdiction checkpoints by reasoning that the sobriety
checkpoints were constitutional because they were based on a
concern for highway safety. 71 By contrast, the primary purpose of
the Indianapolis drug interdiction checkpoints was indistinguishable
from that of the general interest in crime control.72

suspicionless roadblock seizures are constitutionally permissible if
conducted according to a plan that limits the discretion of the officers
conducting the stops. I am not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte
were correctly decided. Indeed, I rather doubt that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment would have considered "reasonable" a program of
indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.
Id. at 462.
67 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000).
68 These checkpoints are roadblocks used by the police to detect drug
traffickers. See Sandra Guerra, Criminal Law: Domestic Drug Interdiction
Operations: Finding the Balance, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1132
(1992). At a fixed location, drivers are stopped and asked for their license and
registration. Id. at 1133. These stops provide officers with an opportunity to look
inside the vehicles and to detect signs of impairment from the driver. Id. At the
drug interdiction points at issue in Edmond, a narcotics detection dog was also
walked around the outside of each stopped vehicle to sniff for narcotics. See
Edmond, 121 S. Ct. at 451.
69 Edmond, 121 S. Ct. at 454.
70 Id. at 457.
7 Id. at 455. "Only with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is
society confronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and
limb that the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz was designed to eliminate." Id.
72 Id. This distinction, however, appears flawed. Like sobriety checkpoints,
where the purpose is to identify, arrest, and prosecute drunk drivers, the purpose
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The sum and substance of the Court's decisions reveals that the
Court has made a clear distinction between privacy interests in the
home and privacy interests in an automobile. The mobility of an
automobile and its function of traveling on public thoroughfares
means that an individual in a vehicle will only be afforded a
diminished expectation of privacy. The mere fact that an individual
is in an automobile, therefore, serves to subject the individual to a
greater likelihood of being searched without any Fourth Amendment implications.

b. Sense Enhanced "Searches"
Sense enhancing devices allow law enforcement officials to
conduct non-physical invasions into zones of privacy.73 These
sense enhanced "searches" allow the police to obtain evidence that
can not otherwise be obtained either at all or without some physical
intrusion.74 As a result, the superficial distinction as to whether
there has been some actual physical intrusion is what distinguishes
a search from a sense-enhanced "search."
In terms of expectations of privacy, the Supreme Court has also
begun to decrease the sphere of privacy an individual has in
general. 75 The same year that the Supreme Court decided in

of the drug interdiction checkpoints were to identify, arrest, and prosecute drug
traffickers.
13 See e.g., Peter Joseph Bober, Note, The "Chemical Signature"
of the
Fourth Amendment: Gas Chromotography/Mass Spectrometry and the War on
Drugs, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 75, 79-82 (1997) (discussing a device used
to detect the presence of drugs); Laura B. Riley, Comment, Concealed Weapon
Detectors and the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Remote SenseEnhanced Searches, 45 UCLA L. REv. 281 (1997) (discussing the use of
concealed weapon detectors).
14 For

example: concealed weapons detectors are used to detect weapons
without a physical frisk; thermal imaging devices allow detection of the possible
locations of heat lamps without a physical search; and gas chromotograph
devices that detects drugs by testing the air around suspects.
" See e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that a dog
sniff of luggage did not violate any Fourth Amendment rights); see also David

E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563,
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Knotts, that the use of a beeper to monitor the movement of a car
did not constitute a search, the Court was also faced with the issue
of whether the exposure of luggage to a trained narcotics detection
dog constituted a search.7 6 Holding that the dog sniff did not
constitute a search, the Court, in United States v. Place, reasoned
that the sniff test was much less intrusive than a typical search.77
The Court found that the limited scope of the search made by a
dog sniff for the presence or absence of narcotics "ensure[d] that
the owner of the property [was] not subjected to the embarrassment
and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive
investigative methods. 78 As such, it did not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment.79
Concurring in the result only, Justices Brennan and Marshall
recognized that the dog sniff "add[ed] a new and previously
unobtainable dimension to human perception ... [which] represent[ed] a greater intrusion into an individual's privacy. ' 8 They
noted that the Court unnecessarily addressed the issue of whether
the dog sniff constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.81

568-83 (1990) (discussing the Fourth Amendment concerns raised by senseenhanced searches and arguing that these types of searches encourages improper
police practices).
76 See Place, 462 U.S. 696.
" Id. at 707. According to the Court, the difference between a dog sniff and
a typical search was that the dog sniff does not require the opening of the
luggage. Id. In contrast, a typical search, such as the rummaging through of
luggage contents by an officer, would expose "noncontraband items that
otherwise would remain hidden from public view." Id.
78 id.

7' This

reasoning was again applied in Edmond, where the procedure during
the checkpoint involved an officer walking a narcotics-detection dog around a car
at checkpoints to try to detect narcotics in the automobile. Edmond, 121 S. Ct.
at 451. Reaffirming Place, the Court noted that "[t]he fact that officers walk a
narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis
checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search." Id. at 453. "Just as in
Place, an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car and
is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence
of narcotics. Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks
around a car is 'much less intrusive than a typical search."' Id.
80 Place, 462 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring).
81 Id. "In any event, I would leave the determination of whether dog sniffs
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Reasoning that "[t]he use of dogs represented a greater intrusion
into an individual's privacy[,]" Justices Brennan and Marshall
argued that "[s]uch use implicate[d] concerns that [were] at least
as sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain electronic
detection devices. 82
One of the latest types of sense enhancing searches being
conducted by law enforcement officials is the use of thermal
imaging devices to scan for marijuana growth. These infrared
detection devices provide a visual image of heat radiating from an
object being analyzed.83 While the thermal imaging device does
not emit any beams or rays, it collects thermal energy and converts
that energy into a color on a predetermined color scale.84 In
effect, these devices allow police officers to enhance their detection
capabilities so as to see behind walls and determine whether an
individual is using heat lamps to grow marijuana.85 The Supreme
Court has recently heard arguments in Kyllo v. United States86 and
is set to resolve the split among the lower courts 87 by deciding on
the constitutionality of the use of thermal imagers. In Kyllo, the
defendant was convicted for manufacturing marijuana based on

of luggage amount to searches, and the subsidiary question of what standards
should govern such intrusions, to a future case providing an appropriate, and
more informed, basis for deciding these questions." Id. at 720.
82

Id. at 719-20.

" See T. Wade Mcknight, Comment, Passive, Sensory-EnhancedSearches:
Shifting the FourthAmendment "Reasonableness" Burden, 59 LA. L. REv. 1243,
1249-50 (1999); Michael D. O'Mara, Comment, Thermal Surveillance and the
FourthAmendment: Heating Up the War on Drugs, 100 DICK. L. REv. 415, 41718 (1996); Tracy M. White, Note, The Heat Is On: The Warrantless Use of
Infrared Surveillance to Detect Indoor MarijuanaCultivation, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
295, 296 (1995).
8 See O'Mara, supra note 83, at 417.
85 See McKnight, supra note 83, at 1249.
86 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 29 (2000) (No.
99-8508).
87 See id. (upholding thermal image scans); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d
850 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding that the use of a thermal imager as non-intrusive);
United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wisc. 1994) (holding the
warrantless use of a thermal imager improper); United States v. Penny-Feeney,
773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1991) (holding that use of thermal imagers was not
a search under the Fourth Amendment).

FOURTH AMENDMENT

849

evidence that was seized during a search of his home pursuant to
the execution of a search warrant.88 The search warrant had been
issued based, in part, on information from a thermal image scan of
defendant's house that showed high levels of heat emanating from
the roof of defendant's garage.89 In deciding the issue, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the thermal image scan was
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because
it was not intrusive. 90 Reasoning that the defendant had not
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy by attempting to
conceal the heat emitted from his home, the Ninth Circuit court
held that the heat waste emanating from the defendant's home did
not constitute an expectation of privacy that society would be
willing to recognize as reasonable. 91
Another line of reasoning that is open for adoption by the
Supreme Court is the approach taken by the Western District Court
of Wisconsin in United States v. Field.92 In Field, the District
Court rejected the argument that the thermal imaging device was
non-intrusive because it collected heat passively. 93 Analogizing
the device to high-powered telescopes and wiretaps which are
similarly passive, 94 the District Court reasoned that the whole
point of using the device was to detect activity within the home. 95
The District Court further noted that there was no conscious
decision by the homeowner to release heat and therefore it could
not be analogized to trash that is intentionally thrown out. 96 If the
Supreme Court chooses to follow the Field line of reasoning, the
Court may narrow its finding to the fact that the thermal imaging
device is being used to detect activity inside a home. 97 The
88 Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044.
89 id.
90

Id. at 1046.

91 Id.

92 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wisc. 1994).
9'Id. at 1530.
94 id.

" Id. at 1532.
96

Id.

9' The Supreme Court has traditionally recognized a greater expectation of
privacy in relation to the home than anywhere else. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
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Supreme Court may similarly find that there is a sufficient
intrusion as to require the police to obtain a warrant prior to using
the thermal imaging device.
Given its prior rulings in Place and Knotts, the Supreme Court,
is likely to affirm the ruling by the Ninth Circuit in Kyllo. Thus,
the Court is likely to continue allowing law enforcement officials
to conduct non-intrusive searches with sense enhancing devices
without any Fourth Amendment implications.
c.

The Plain View Doctrine

The Court created another exception to Fourth Amendment
searches with the plain view doctrine. Similar to the Fourth
Amendment search analysis, the plain view doctrine utilizes a twoprong test. 98 First, the evidence must not only be in plain view,
but its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent. 99 Second, the officer must be lawfully on the premises as well
as have a lawful right of access to the object.'00 Thus, if an
officer is lawfully on the premises, and observes something in plain
view, that item is seizable even in the absence of a warrant.01
For example, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the police seized
and searched the defendant's car without a valid warrant. 2 The
98 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (holding that the discovery and
seizure of weapons in plain view during the execution of a search warrant, which
only authorized a search for the proceeds of the bank robbery, was not prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment).
9 Id. at 136.
'0o Id. at 137.
'' See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court in Hicks, reasoned that "It]he theory
of [the plain view doctrine] consists of extending to nonpublic places such as the
home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable, the police's longstanding authority to make warrantless seizures in
public places of such objects as weapons and contraband." Hicks, 480 U.S. at
326-27. See also Horton, 496 U.S. at 128 (holding that the seizure of items
discovered in plain view during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant did
not violate).
102 403 U.S. at 447. The Court found that the warrant "authorizing the
seizure and subsequent search of [the] automobile was invalid because [it] was
not issued by a 'neutral and detached magistrate,"' but rather by the Attorney
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police had questioned the defendant in connection with a murder
investigation. °3 The government argued that although the warrant
was invalid, the search should still fall under one of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement. The Court rejected the argument that
the search fell within the ambit of the plain view doctrine and held
that the doctrine does not apply where the police know in advance,
the location of the evidence and intend to seize it but did not
obtain a warrant.' °4 In contrast, however, the Court reasoned that
had the object been inadvertently
discovered, it would fall under
10 5
doctrine.
the plain view
Applying this analysis, the Court has ruled, for example, that
the moving of an instrument to determine the serial numbers
constituted a search. 10 6 In Arizona v. Hicks, police officers responded to the defendant's apartment to search for a shooter that
had fired a shot into the apartment below. 0 7 Upon entering the
apartment, they found and seized, inter alia, several weapons.108
One of the officers also noticed two sets of expensive stereo
equipment that seemed out of place in the defendant's apartment.'0 9 Believing them to have been stolen, the officer lifted the
stereo to record their serial numbers."0 The Supreme Court
reasoned that while a mere inspection of the radio equipment that
came into view would have produced no additional invasion of
privacy interest, the movement of the equipment exposed concealed
portions of the apartment."' Although, this new search "uncovered nothing of any great personal value," the Court held that a

General in charge of investigating and later prosecuting the case. Id. at 449-50.
103 Id. at 445-46.
'04 Id. at 470. "The police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant;
they knew the automobile's exact description and location well in advance; they
intended to seize it when they came upon Coolidge's property." Id. at 472.
105Id. at 465-67.
'o Hicks, 480 U.S. 321.
1 7 Id. at 323.
108

id.

109 Id.
110

Id.

...
Id. at 325.
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"search [was] a search, even if it happen[ed] to disclose nothing
but the bottom of a turntable.""' 2
In sum, the plain view doctrine provides a clear cut, bright line
guideline for police officers. The doctrine allows the police to seize
incriminating material inadvertently discovered in a legitimate
search, while at the same time protecting an individual from any
material discovered during unreasonable, unlawful searches.
d. State Interpretation of Privacy and Dog Sniffs
Finding that the Supreme Court's decision in Place, was overly
narrow, several states have interpreted dog sniffs as qualifying as
searches under their state constitutions." 3 For example, agreeing
with Justice Blackmun's dissent in Place, the Court of Appeals of
Alaska, in Pooley v. Alaska, found that a dog sniff of luggage did
constitute a search, albeit a minimally intrusive one." 4 The Court
reasoned that the Alaska Constitution provides the individual with
more privacy rights than the federal Constitution. "' Upholding
the lower court's refusal to suppress the drugs found in the
defendant's luggage, the Court found that reasonable suspicion was
sufficient to justify the search. 1 16 The Court further stated that
"the reasonableness of the dog's use in the particular circumstances
should be determined by balancing the state's interests in using the

112 Id.

"' See, e.g., State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn,
563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990); Pooley v. Alaska, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alas. Ct. App.
1985). The United States Constitution sets forth the proposition that federal
courts have jurisdiction over federal constitutional issues. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution . . . . In all other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact."). If
there is a conflict over a state court interpretation and a federal court interpretation on a federal constitutional issue, the state interpretation must yield to the
federal court interpretation. See id.; see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). However, in interpreting state constitutions, the state
court is the final arbiter.
114 705

115 Id.
116

Id.

P.2d at 1311.
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dog against the individual's
interest in freedom from unreasonable
7
government intrusions."'
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in State v.
Pellicci, held that the use of a dog to sniff the exterior of an
automobile constituted a search under the New Hampshire
Constitution." 8 Distinguishing the state analysis of searches from
the Supreme Court's analysis of searches, the New Hampshire
Court reasoned that under the New Hampshire Constitution, a
search was implied by a "quest by an officer of law, a prying into
hidden places for that which is concealed."" 9 Since the use of the
dog was for the detection of any contraband within the vehicle, the
dog sniff constituted a search. 2 ° However, the Court found that
the search was justified since the officers had a reasonable or
founded suspicion for the search.' 2 '
Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals also declared that a
dog sniff constituted a search under the New York Constitution. 2 2 Unlike the Pellicci court, however, the court, in People
v. Dunn, used a similar analysis for the determination of searches
as the United States Supreme Court. 23 While acknowledging that
a dog only sniffs the outside area, the Court analogized the odors
emanating from an apartment to the sound waves that were
"harnessed" in Katz. 124 The Court reasoned that both of these
emanations originated from an area that was unexposed to all
except supersensitive detection devices. 25 The defendant's
conviction, however, was upheld because the police had a reason26
able suspicion that the residence contained illicit contraband.
The Court found that since the drug detection dog was "uniquely
discriminate and nonintrusive" as well as of "significant utility to

117Id.

"1 580 A.2d 710, 716 (N.H. 1990).
119Id.
120 id.

Id. at 717.
Dunn, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
123 Id. at 392.

121

122
124

Id.

125 Id.
126 Id.
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law enforcement authorities," probable cause was not7 necessary for
12
its use, as long as there was reasonable suspicion.
The courts are in disagreement over whether to follow the
Supreme Court's restricted interpretation with respect to sense
enhanced searches. The Supreme Court's line of reasoning has
resulted in state courts attempting to find other rationales for
finding intrusions of privacy with respect to dog sniffs.
2.

The Fifth Amendment and the Freedom
from Self-Incrimination

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
people from compelled self-incrimination. 128 Although the Constitution protects defendants from being compelled to provide
testimonial or communicative evidence, it does not extend to
protect defendants from providing evidence that identifies some
physical characteristic of the defendant. 129 Beginning in Holt v.
United States, the Supreme Court made this distinction clear in its
analysis of what constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. 3 ' In Holt, the Court held that
compelling a defendant to try on and exhibit for the jury, a blouse
that was in evidence, did not violate his right against self-incrimination. 131 The Court reasoned that the "prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort

127

128

Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall

any person ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

Id.
129 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (holding that the taking
of defendant's handwriting exemplars did not violate the Fifth Amendment);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that compelling the

defendant to speak within hearing distance of witnesses, for identification
purposes, did not violate Fifth Amendment rights).

218 U.S. 245 (1910).
Id. at 253. There was a question as to whether a blouse belonged to the
defendant. A witness had testified that the defendant had put on the blouse and
that it had fit him. Id. at 252.
130

131

FOURTH AMENDMENT

855

communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material."' 32 The Court analogized the
prohibition of compelling a defendant to try on and exhibit himself
with the blouse on to "forbid[ding] a jury to look at a prisoner and
compare his features with a photograph in proof."' 33
Reaffirming the holding of Holt, the Court in Schmerber v.
California, held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination only "protects an accused only from being compelled
to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature."' 13 4 Thus, the
Court reasoned that the withdrawal and analysis of blood from the
defendant did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 3 ' The Court's
analysis of this issue turned, not on whether the administration of
the blood test over the defendant's objection constituted compulsion, but whether the defendant was "compelled to be a witness
against himself."' 36 Noting that the Fifth Amendment right offers
"no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to
make a particular gesture[,]" the Court distinguished tests such as
lie detector tests that obtain physical evidence but are "directed to
eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial." '37 The
Court appeared to find that the "spirit and history" of the Fifth
Amendment was evoked only where a person was compelled to
submit to testing by which an effort was made to determine his
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses."'
With similar reasoning, the Court, in Gilbert v. California,
extended the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment right to
handwriting exemplars. 39 While noting that a person's voice and

Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 253.
134 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
132
133

135 id.
136 id.
137

Id. at 764

138 Id.

139 388 U.S. 263 (1967). The defendant, who was arrested for a robbery,
answered questions regarding several robberies in which the robber had used a
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handwriting are means of communication, the Court nevertheless
held that the defendant's right against self-incrimination was not
violated. 4 ' The Court reasoned that despite being a means of
communication, not every compulsion of voice or handwriting was
a communication in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 14' According to the Court, "[a] mere handwriting exemplar,
in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body
itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside [the Fifth
Amendment] protection.,'142 The Court further reasoned that there
was no claim that43the content of the exemplars was "testimonial or
1
communicative."
The Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in United States
v. Wade,"44 a case decided on the same day as Gilbert. In Wade,
the Supreme Court ruled that the compulsion of the defendant to
speak at a lineup conducted for identification purposes was also not
testimonial in nature. 145 Therefore, it did not violate any privilege
against self-incrimination.146 Again the Court relied on the
distinction between a physical
characteristic and the more abstract
47
communication purpose.1
In contrast, however, where the defendant is asked to provide
information such as the date of his sixth birthday, the Supreme
Court has held that the privilege against self-incrimination is

handwritten note. It was during this interrogation that the defendant gave the
agent handwriting exemplars. Id. at 266.
140 Id.

at 266.

141 Id.
142 Id.
143

144
145

at 266-67.

Id. at 267.

388 U.S. 218 (1967).

Id.; see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1972) (reaffirming

that there is no Fifth Amendment violation in requiring the defendant to provide
voice exemplars where the exemplars were to be used only to measure the
physical properties of the witnesses' voices and not for its testimonial or
communicative content).
146

388 U.S. 218.

Wade, 388 U.S. at 222. "We have no doubt that compelling the accused
merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to
trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial
significance." Id.
147
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invoked.48 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the Court stated that the
basis for the privilege was the "unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt . ... ,,149 Thus, the Court reasoned that whenever a
suspect is asked for a response that "requir[es] him to communicate
an express or implied assertion of fact or belief," the trilemma of
"truth, falsity, or silence" is confronted. 5 ° Since the sixth birthday question requested information from the defendant that, for
whatever reason, he may not remember or be able to calculate, the
Court found that the question required a testimonial response.15
the Fifth Amendment right against selfAs such, it violated
152
incrimination.
In sum, the Supreme Court has drawn a narrow distinction
between physical characteristics and communicative information in
determining Fifth Amendment self-incrimination violation. Unless
there is some kind of factual content-based response requested from
the defendant that forces the defendant into a trilemma of remaining silent, self-incrimination, or lying, there is no privilege against
self-incrimination.
B. Technology
The latest invention in fighting crime is the P.A.S. III.
Developed under the direction of various insurance and highway
safety organizations153 and touted as non-intrusive, 154 this innocuous looking flashlight with a built-in breathalyzer is being
used to analyze a driver's breath without their participation or con-

See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
Id. at 596 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988)).
150 Id. at 597.
' Id. at 599.

148
149

152

Id. at 600.

153 Rick Lockridge, CNN - Flashlight Has a Nose for Drunken Drivers,

at http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/1999),
16,
(June
9906/16/driving.while.illuminated.tt.
154 PAS Systems International: P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniffalcohol.com/prod0l.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
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sent. 155 The sensor that is attached to the flashlight is an electrochemical fuel cell that detects the presence of alcohol in the air of
156
the car.
In order to analyze a driver's breath, the tool needs to be held
within ten inches from the driver as the driver is exhaling. 5 ' In
order to obtain a sample of exhaled air, the Sniffer's manufacturer,
PAS Systems International, suggests that the officer request the
driver to give their name, address, and date of birth.1 58 A pump
within the sensor draws in a sample of the exhaled breath as well
as the air in the car and the fuel cell analyzes the amount of
alcohol in the sample.1 59 A bar display on the flashlight indicates
the possible blood alcohol content detected. 60 The display ranges
from green to red, which corresponds to an approximate blood
alcohol content range of .01 to .12.161 For daytime use, an innocuous looking clipboard with an attached breathalyzer serves the
12
same function.
The tool is currently being used in an increasing number of
states. 163 Among the states that are testing the device are Massachusetts, Rhode Island, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Tennessee, and Texas.' 64 In addition, other states

Id. ("The P.A.S. III helps operator formulate probable cause without
subject's active involvement.").
156 Id.
157 PAS Systems International:Law Enforcement, at http://www.sniffalcohol.155

com/law.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). However, the closer the P.A.S. III is
held, the more likely it will yield a more accurate result. Id.
158 PAS Systems International: P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniffalcohol.com/prod01.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
159 Id.
160 id.
161 Id.
162 Brook

A. Masters & Tom Jackman, Sniffer Routs Out Drunk Drivers:
Rights Advocates Decry Use of Device, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2000, at B01.
163 All Things Considered: Interview: Todd Cubberly, Richardson Police
Department,Texas, DiscussesNew Passive Alcohol Sensors Used in Flashlights
(NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 19, 2000).
'64 Police Flashlight that Sniffs Alcohol Seen as Tool Against Underage
Drinking, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL - BULLETIN, Feb. 2, 2001, at 8C.
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currently using the device include Ohio, 165 Michigan, 166 New
Mexico, 167 North Carolina, 168 South Carolina, 169 Wisconsin, 7 ° Oregon as well as Indiana.' 7 ' The use of the P.A.S. III
is being advocated by insurance companies, 172 as well as groups
Driving, who buy and donate
such as Mothers Against Drunk
73
P.A.S. III units to the police.

Given the nature of the P.A.S. III system and the instructions
for its use, the device unnecessarily intrudes upon the privacy of an
individual. To ensure some level of accuracy, the device necessarily needs to be held as close to the driver's mouth as possible,
which may necessarily lead to an intrusion into the interior of the
car. Furthermore, the practical application of the P.A.S. III system,
in effect, renders the device to be an ad hoc lie detector test. As
such, the use of the P.A.S. III also unconstitutionally infringes on
an individual's right to be free from self-incrimination.

165 Bruce Cadwallader, FlashlightHelps Police Spot Drunken Drivers Sensor

Can Detect Alcohol on Breath, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 26, 2000, at 1E.
"6 New Police Flashlights Can 'Smell' Alcohol, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec.
25, 2000, at D6.
167 Gallagher, supra note 6.
168 Sheriffs DepartmentGets Alcohol Sensors, NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 4,
1999, at B3.
169 Gene Crider, Officers' New Tool to Shine Light on Drunk Drivers, THE
HERALD,
170

June 27, 2000, at 2B.

Anne Bothwell, Just a Little Breath Will Do You in Flashlight Device

Detects Alcohol on Drivers' Breath, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Sept. 2, 1994, at lB.
17' Eric Peters, Sniffer Promises a Secret Way to Deflate People'sLiberties,
DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 7, 2000, at 14.
172 Greg Rickabaugh, Crime Watch: Tool Combats Drunken Driving;
Officers Use New Device to Detect Alcohol Levels Covertly, Sparking Debate on
Privacy, AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 9, 2000, at Al.
173 Pete Williams, New Device Sniffs Out Drunk Drivers, (Aug. 28, 2000),
at http://www.msnbc.com/news/452360.asp. "Just this summer, [M.A.D.D.]
bought 38 of the units and donated them to police." Id.
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIVE ALCOHOL SENSOR
A.

Federal ConstitutionalAnalysis
1.

Fourth Amendment Analysis and Argument

Against Constitutionality
The latest advances in information technology and the Internet
has led to an increased concern over individual privacy rights in
identity.' 74 In fact, the trend is towards protecting the privacy an
individual has in their identity. 75 Ironically, however, there does
not seem to be a similar concern over protecting privacy rights in
terms of individual liberty. In fact, there seems to be a willingness
to sacrifice those privacy rights in exchange for supposed personal
safety. The resounding theme in recent cases suggests that if it
makes it easier for the police to catch a criminal, then minor
76
intrusions into privacy are acceptable.

See Leslie Miller, In the Internet We Trust Fears Aside, Americans
Regularly Reveal Private Information, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2000, at 3D;
Robert O'Harrow Jr., Wired Economy: States Jump into Privacy Battle, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 2000, at G11; Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, International
Privacy: Safe HarborProtectionfor PersonalData, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 10, 2000, at
3; UCLA Internet Report Refutes Many Preconceived Notions about Online
Guidelines, ASCRIBE NEWS, Oct. 25, 2000; see also Consumer Privacy Protection
Act, S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000) ("To protect the privacy of American
consumers."); Health Information Privacy Act, H.R. 1941, 106th Cong. (1999)
("To protect the privacy of personally identifiable health information."); Chief
Information Officer of the United States of America, H.R. 4670, 106th Cong.
(2000) ("To establish an Office of Information Technology in the Executive
Office of the President."); Privacy Commission Act, H.R. 4049, 106th Cong.
(2000) ("To establish the Commission for the Comprehensive Study of Privacy
Protection.").
171 See Miller, supra note 174; O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 174; Raysman &
Brown, supra, note 174; UCLA Internet Report Refutes Many Preconceived
Notions about Online Guidelines, supra note 174; S. 2606; H.R. 1941; H.R.
4670; F.R. 4049.
176 This is a resounding theme of Justice Rehnquist's and Justice White's
dissents in cases that hold against warrantless arrests and searches. See, e.g.,
174

FOURTH AMENDMENT
The cost of this tradeoff is the diminution of an individual's
expectation of privacy in his day to day affairs.177 Starting with
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court has ruled
in favor of a gradual decrease in an individual's expectation of
privacy. 178 In Dow, the Court held that the aerial surveillance, by
which a private corporation hired by a government agency to fly
overhead and take photographs of the facility, constituted neither
a search nor a seizure - even where a security system had been
installed to keep people out. 179 The Court continued its course in
Florida v. Riley where it held that an aerial surveillance of the
defendant's greenhouse did not violate the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights, despite the fact that the defendant had covered
all but a small portion of the greenhouse in his backyard.' 8° The
Riley Court reasoned that the use of a helicopter circling at around
four hundred feet above the property did not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment since the garden was observable by

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 618 (1980) (White, J., dissenting in which
Rehnquist, J., joined) ("[W]hile exaggerating the invasion of personal privacy
involved in home arrests, the [majority] fails to account for the danger that its
rule will 'severely hamper effective law enforcement."'); Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 760 (1984) (White, J., dissenting in which Rehnquist, J., joined)
("A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances turns on a perceived
gravity of the crime would significantly hamper law enforcement."); see also
Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of Search
and Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2 (1999) ("More
recently, the Court's decisions have favored state interests by specifically
assisting the police in the performance of official duties and providing bright-line
rules that expanded police authority to search a detainee during a traffic stop.")
177 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that
the use of a dog to sniff for drugs did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that the
use of a beeper to track the movement of a car did not invade any legitimate
expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on a telephone);
Cardwell v. Louis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974) (holding that neither the
examination of the defendant's tires nor the collecting of pain samples from the
defendant's car violated any expectation of privacy).
178 476
79 Id.

80

U.S. 227 (1986).

at 239.
488 U.S. 445 (1989).

862

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the naked eye. 1 8' Because the police, "like the public, would have
been free to inspect the backyard garden from the street if their
view had been unobstructed[,] [t]hey were likewise free to inspect
the yard from the vantage point of an aircraft flying in the
navigable airspace as this plane was."'' 82 Disregarding the fact
that the greenhouse was obscured from view by surrounding
property, trees, shrubs, and a mobile home, as well as the fact that
approximately ninety percent of the greenhouse roof was covered
by corrugated roofing panels, 83 the Court concluded that8 the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.'
In light of current case law, the Sniffer is likely to pass any
Fourth Amendment challenge on its use. A finding of its constitutionality will likely be based on its use and purpose of stopping
drunk drivers and its non-intrusiveness. Since an individual has a
diminished expectation of privacy in a car and because police may
legitimately stop cars at sobriety checkpoints, 85 a determination
of constitutionality will turn on whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy to the air in the car. 86 Although it can be
argued that an officer may physically intrude into the interior of a
car to accept a driver's license and registration, the use of the
Sniffer adds an additional aspect to any physical intrusion. As such,
the use of the Sniffer includes, not just a possible physical intrusion
into the car, but an attempt to search out the existence of alcohol
in the air.
Proponents of the device are likely to argue that the use of the
device is similar to the dog sniff upheld in Place and that,
therefore, it does not constitute a search. Both the device and a dog
sniff attempt to detect an odor of a specific contraband. Both are
limited to detection of that type of contraband only. Moreover, an
analogy is likely to be drawn between an individual's expelled air
as the body's waste and the waste that is left on the street for
Id. at 451.
I81
18IId. at 449-50.
183 Id.

at 448.

'84Id.

at 450-51.

'85 See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
186 See supra Part I.A. L.a for a detailed discussion on expectations of privacy
as applied to automobiles.
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collection. 87 Similar to the garbage that is left on the street, there
88
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in exhaled air.
Depending on how the Supreme Court rules regarding the use
of thermal imaging devices, proponents of the P.A.S. III may also
draw an analogy between the P.A.S. III and the thermal imager.
Both devices are non-intrusive means of detecting criminality.
Furthermore, if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
heat waste, an argument can be made that there is similarly no
reasonable expectation of privacy in exhaled air. On the other hand,
if the Supreme Court rules that the use of the thermal imaging
device violates the Fourth Amendment, proponents of the P.A.S. III
are likely to distinguish the use of the thermal imager by arguing
that the thermal imager is being used on a home whereas the
Sniffer is being used on an individual in an automobile - an area
that the Supreme Court has already recognized a diminished
expectation of privacy.
An argument can also be made that the state's interest in
catching any and all drivers who are driving while intoxicated or
under the influence outweighs any minimal intrusion to drivers
stopped at sobriety checkpoints. In fact, since the Sniffer is nonintrusive, it can be argued that its use is far outweighed by the
state's interest in public health and safety by preventing drunk
drivers. These arguments, however, must fail. The mild intrusive-

...See Aaron Larks-Stanford, Comment, The Warrantless Use of Thermal
Imaging and "Intimate Details": Why Growing Pot Indoors and Washing Dishes
Are Similar Activities Under the Fourth Amendment, 49 CATH. U.L. REV. 575,

587 (2000) (discussing the Supreme Court's release and emanation rationale in
finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage); Kathleen A. Lomas,
Note, Bad Physics and Bad Law: A Review of the Constitutionality of Thermal
Imagery Surveillance after United States v. Elkins, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 808

(2000) (discussing the heat waste rationale for finding that the use of thermal
imaging devices are not searches); Jennifer Murphy, Comment, Trash, Thermal
Imagers, and the FourthAmendment: The New Search and Seizure, 53 SMU L.

REV. 1645, 1667 (2000) ("This 'waste heat' that the [thermal imager] detected
was analogized to the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left on the curb
outside of a residence.").
188 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626
(1989) ("In all the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the administration of
a breath test implicates significant privacy concerns.")
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ness of a procedure should not be determinative of the outcome. 189 The focus should be on the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against invasions of privacy and not on the amount of
intrusiveness.' 90 As such, the silent intrusion into the interior of
the car in an attempt to search out criminality constitutes an
unreasonable invasion of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.19 '
The manufacturers of the Sniffer argue that the device is a
legitimate tool because there is no "question of a 'trespass' or
'intrusion' into the privacy of an individual."' 192 They base their
argument on the idea that the Sniffer is protected under the plain
view doctrine 193 and on the grounds that it is not an "evidential
1"'

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (citing Boyd v.

United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated
by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed ... It is the duty of
the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Id. at 453-54. See also Gregory L. Kelley, Comment, The Warrantless Use of
Thermal Imagery, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 597, 642 (1995) (arguing that the
classification of the thermal image device as passive "sheds no light on the true
issues involved in assessing the constitutionality of a search").
190 See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the TwentyFirst Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990). Professor Katz argues that the Katz
decision was supposed to provide a framework for ensuring freedom by
protecting personal security and that it was supposed to "restore the equilibrium
between the individual and his government." Id. Professor Katz notes, however,
that Katz has not resulted in the expansion of constitutional guarantees of
individual privacy. Id; see also Kelley, supra note 191, at 642.
191See Riley, supra note 73, at 309-12. "The fact that no touching or
probing is involved does not reduce the 'intrusiveness' of devices that can reveal
the most intimate information about one's body or activities conducted within
one's home." Riley, supra note 73, at 310.
192 PAS Systems International: P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniffalcohol.com/prod0l.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
193 PAS Systems International:Law Enforcement, at http://www.sniffalcohol.com/law.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). The manufacturers refer to the doctrine

FOURTH AMENDMENT
test."'

94

865

The manufacturers contend that since the plain view

doctrine covers "sensory impressions gained by an officer who is
legally present in the position from where he gains them,"' 95 the
use of the Sniffer is constitutional because it is "nothing more than
an extension of the officer's nose."' 196 Furthermore, it is argued
that since an officer who is speaking to a driver as part of his
investigation of drunk driving has both the right and the responsibility to observe the driver,"9 and since the breath an individual
exhales is being put out into the public airspace, the use of the
Sniffer falls under the plain view doctrine.198
This argument, however, must fail as well. In order to fall
within the ambit of the plain view doctrine, the police must
legitimately be in the location and the item seized or searched must
be readily or immediately apparent. 199 While the police have a
right to be present and operate sobriety checkpoints,2 ° the alcohol on a driver's breath is not always readily apparent.20 Where
as the plain sight doctrine. The plain sight or plain view doctrine allows police
officers to seize evidence that is in "plain view" when the officers are conducting
a legitimate stop or search. Id.
"' PAS Systems International:P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniffalcohol.com/prod0l.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). The manufacturers argue that the
breath test performed by the Sniffer is not being used as evidence. However,
while it is not specific evidence, it is evidence that can be referred to or relied
on as establishing probable cause to request further sobriety testing.
195 PAS III Flashlight,at http://www.alcotech.co.za/pasiiil.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2001).
196 Pete Williams, New Device Sniffs Out Drunk Drivers, Aug. 28, 2000, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/452360.asp.
197 PAS FlashlightIII, at http://www.alcotech.co.za/pasiiil.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2001).
198 Id.

'99 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1990) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime
in plain view even though the police officer, who only had a warrant to search
for stolen rings, was also interested in finding other evidence connected with the
crime and, therefore, did not discover the evidence inadvertently).
200 See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
201 The driver may not have drank enough alcohol as to be detectable, the

alcohol consumed may have been an alcohol such as vodka that has little odor,
or the driver may have used breath mints. PAS Flashlight III, at
http://www.alcotech.co.za/pasiiil.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
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it is not, the use of the Sniffer does not fall under the plain view
doctrine." 2 As such, the Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Hicks,
held that the slight search of lifting up a stereo to check the serial
number was unconstitutional. 2 3 The Court reasoned that the
serial number could not have been in2° plain view since the officer
had to move the stereo to look at it.
The current Fourth Amendment search and seizure line of case
law suggests that the Sniffer will likely be determined constitutional. 2 5 The diminished expectation of privacy with respect to
automobiles, the legitimacy of sobriety checkpoints, and the
minimal intrusiveness are all factors that will be the basis for the
ruling on its constitutionality. However, the arguments that the use
of the P.A.S. III is constitutional under the plain view doctrine
must be rejected.
The use of the Sniffer should be deemed to constitute a search.
Unlike garbage that is intentionally left on the street, there is no
similar intentional release of breath into the air. In addition, the
main purpose of the Sniffer is to attempt to detect criminality in
the air where it is not readily detectable. Furthermore, under the
plain view doctrine, the use of the P.A.S. III is not necessary. If the
drunkenness is readily apparent, then the plain view doctrine
applies regardless, and the use of the Sniffer would be superfluous. 206 However, if it is not readily apparent whether someone

In addition, this argument contradicts itself. The argument begins with the
premise that the use of the Sniffer does not constitute a search but it then turns
into an argument that the use of the Sniffer falls under the plain view doctrine.
The plain view exception, however, does not apply unless there has already been
a search. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. "[Pilain view does not occur until a
search is in progress." Id.
203 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
202

204

Id. at 325.

Furthermore, "the overall tendency of the Court has been to contract the
protected individual interest as a consequence of modern technological advances
and their utilization by the government." Clancy, supra note 21, at 335.
According to Professor Clancy, "[o]ne technique has been to find that the effect
of modern life, with its technological and other advances, serves to eliminate or
reduce a person's justified expectation of privacy." Clancy, supra note 21, at
335.
206 The driver's state of drunkenness would already be in plain view.
205
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has consumed alcohol, then the use of the P.A.S. III could not be
legitimized under the plain view doctrine.
At the very least, the use of the Sniffer is a violation of the
spirit of the Fourth Amendment protections.2 7 The framers of the
Constitution could not have possibly conceived the advances in
technology just as it is not possible to conceive of the technology
that will be invented within the next century. However, an
inference can be drawn from the language of the Fourth Amendment that the framers attempted to create a sphere of privacy upon
which law enforcement officials could not arbitrarily intrude in
order to obtain information about an individual and use that
information 2against
that individual without some form of consent
08
or exigency.

207

See Clancy, supra note 21, at 345-49 (arguing that the Fourth Amend-

ment protection protects a right to be secure which is the right to exclude the
government).
208

See generally JOHN H.F. SHATrUCK, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY (1977)

(discussing the history of and the zones of privacy created by the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures). According to
Shattuck:
A major point in [James Madison's] argument for the adoption of
enforceable individual rights was that, unless restricted, the government
might reasonably consider general warrants and other abusive practices
to be necessary for the enforcement of the laws. Accordingly, Madison
introduced a proposal to restrict searches, which was subsequently
adopted with only a few minor charges as the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 5; see also Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443.
[T]here must be a showing by those who seek exemption. . . that the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. '[T]he burden
is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.' In times of
unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal
subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear
unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some, But the values were those of the
authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455. "[Alny intrusion in the way of search or seizure is
an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of necessity." Id. at 467.
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2.

Fifth Amendment Analysis

Assuming that the Sniffer passes Fourth Amendment analysis,
there is also a possible Fifth Amendment issue to consider. As
Justice Douglas suggested, in a concurring opinion in Berger v.
New York, "the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth come into play
20 9
when the accused is 'the unwilling source of the evidence.'
Similarly, in Schmerber v. California, the Court noted that tests
such as lie detector tests that seem to be directed at obtaining
physical evidence may, in fact, be "directed to eliciting responses
which are essentially testimonial., 2 0 The Court reasoned that
"[t]o compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will
be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of
physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the
spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment., 21 ' The use of the
Sniffer subjects the driver to testing without his knowledge or
consent. While the driver is speaking, the officer is testing the
breath that is coming from the driver to determine his guilt or
innocence. The use of the Sniffer also may compel the driver to
provide self-incriminating testimonial evidence without his or her
knowledge or consent. Although the compulsion of the individual
to provide a breath exemplar is not considered testimonial under
the current stream of Fifth Amendment case law, the questioning
by the officer may lead to the compulsion of testimonial evidence
such as whether the driver has been drinking and the amount of
alcohol the driver has consumed. While the Sniffer's results can not
be used in Court as direct evidence, there is no way to avoid its
use as indirect evidence. 22 The officer, who has not observed the
driver exhibit any other signs of consuming alcohol, bases his

209
210

388 U.S. 41, 67 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).

211 Id.

at 764.
Although the results of the Sniffer are not admissible as direct evidence
of intoxication, its use will be admitted as evidence to support the further
detention of the driver for additional testing.
212
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probable cause for administering other sobriety tests solely on the
Sniffer.213
Given the implications for both the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and the Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination, the use of the Passive Alcohol
Sensor III should be ruled unconstitutional. The P.A.S. III is more
than just a mere enhancement of the olfactory senses, it is a
replacement of those senses through the use of a tool. This new
tool allows intrusions into zones of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
B. State ConstitutionalAnalysis
The states that have ruled that canine sniffs do constitute
searches under their respective state constitutions 214 may, in the
end, offer more individual privacy protection. Thus, in a state such
as Alaska, where the Court of Appeals applies a balancing
approach to the use of canine sniffs,2t 5 the use of the P.A.S. III
may be ruled an unreasonable intrusion on an individual's interest
in freedom when weighed against the government's interest in
using the device.216 Similarly, in a state like New Hampshire,
where the Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognizes an implied
search by the use of the dogs because the sniff pried inside to

If the Sniffer registers a false positive for alcohol, the officer may request
that the driver conduct other sobriety tests. As such, even though the officer has
not noticed any other signs of intoxication, the request for further testing is based
on the Sniffer.
213

214 See, e.g., State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn,
563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990); Pooley v. Alaska, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alas. Ct. App.

1985). In all of these states, the constitutionality of the dog sniff search was
upheld. See Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 716; Dunn, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392; Pooley, 705

P.2d 1293. However, the initial inquiry was not aborted by a determination of the
lack of a search. Rather, these dog sniffs were determined to constitute searches
and were upheld because the searches were founded on reasonable suspicion. See
Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 716; Dunn, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392; Pooley, 705 P.2d 1293.
See also supra Part I.A.l.d. for a detailed discussion of these cases.
215 See, e.g., Pooley, 705 P.2d at 1311.
216

Id.
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detect contraband,"1 7 the use of the P.A.S. III may constitute a
violation of state constitutional rights.2 Is Likewise, in a state like
New York, where the Court of Appeals compares emanating odors
to sound waves, 219 the use of the P.A.S. III may be ruled unconstitutional. 220 At the very least, New York may require a finding
of reasonable suspicion prior to the use of the P.A.S. III.
In addition, even states that have ruled that the use of thermal
imaging technology constitutes a search may rule that the use of
the P.A.S. III is an unreasonable invasion of individual privacy
rights. 22' For example, in Young, where the Washington Supreme
Court noted that the "infrared device invaded the home in the sense
[that] the device was able to gather information about the interior
of the defendant's home that could not be obtained by naked eye
observations, 22 2 the use of the P.A.S. III may similarly be
considered a search and in violation of the state's constitutional
protections. 2 3 Similar to the thermal imaging device, the P.A.S.
III also gathers information about the body that could not otherwise
be obtained by observations that are not enhanced by the device.
As such, just because there may not be a physical intrusion as there

217

See, e.g., Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 716.

218

Id.

219

See, e.g., Dunn, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.

220

id.

221 See, e.g., State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997) (holding that the
warrantless use of thermal imaging violated the defendants' right to privacy
guaranteed under the Montana Constitution because there was an actual
expectation of privacy in the heat signatures of activities pursued within the
home that are not exposed to the public and that such an expectation was
reasonable under the heightened standards of the Montana Constitution),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont. 1998); State
v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994) (holding that use of thermal imagers
violated both State and Federal Constitutional protections); Commonwealth v.
Gindlesperger, 706 A.2d 1216 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that use of the
thermal imaging device violated Pennsylvania Constitution because the state
constitution provides individuals with even greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than the federal Constitution).
222 Young, 867 P.2d at 599.
223 Id.
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is with a regular breathalyzer, that does not mean that there is no
224
invasion of privacy.
It appears that an individual may need to resort to state
constitutions to obtain protection from unreasonable government
intrusions with the P.A.S. III. The problem, however, with leaving
it to the states to offer more protection in this case is the lack of
consensus among the states in the approach taken. This will lead
to incongruous results, with some individuals having more rights
to privacy than others depending on which state they live in.
C. Argument for Change
Unlike the thermal imaging cases and the dog sniff cases,
reliance on the states to provide a more expansive notion of a
search in terms of the Sniffer will likely fail. The statistics are
staggering in the amount of alcohol-related deaths and accidents.225 Since the use of the Sniffer is claimed to detect over
fifteen to twenty-five percent more legally intoxicated people than
would be detected without its use, 226 it is unlikely that any state
legislature will attempt to make sure individual rights are protected
vis a vis the use of the Sniffer. In fact, the trend on the federal
level has been for stricter drunk driving laws.227 This has led to
the introduction of legislation setting the national level of intoxication at a blood alcohol content of .08 or higher. 228 The statistics,

224 See id. "Just because technology now allows this information to be gained
without stepping inside the physical structure, it does not mean the home has not
been invaded for the purposes of [the state constitution]." Id.
225 In both 1997 and 1998, there were approximately 16,000 alcohol related
deaths. Kenny Morse, Drinkingand Driving,at http://www.mrtraffic.com/dui.htm

(last visited Mar. 30, 2001).

226 PAS Systems International:Law Enforcement, at http://www.sniffalcohol.-

com/law.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
227See, e.g., Safe and Sober Streets Act of 1999, H.R. 1595, 106th Cong.
(1999) ("A bill to amend title 23, United States Code, to provide for a national
standard to prohibit the operation of motor vehicles by individuals under the
influence of alcohol."); Safe and Sober Streets Act of 1999, S. 222, 106th Cong.
(1999) ("A bill to amend title 23, United States Code, to provide for a national
standard to prohibit the operation of motor vehicles by intoxicated individuals.").
228 Id. The current level of per se intoxication is a blood alcohol content of
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however, fail to take into account other factors. If the use of this
system is found to be constitutional, the Supreme Court will have
a hard time justifying and distinguishing any future technological
advances in law enforcement. 229 It is time for the Supreme Court
to draw the line. Although the automobile exception began as
merely another exception to a warrantless search or seizure, the
trend in the case law has all but removed any Fourth Amendment
protections an individual enjoys in his or her vehicle.23 ° To allow
the interpretation of the search and seizure clause to deteriorate any
further is to allow the Fourth Amendment to become nothing more
than fifty-four empty words.
Dissenting in United States v. Jacobsen, Justice Brennan
presciently recognized that the majority had "paved the way for
technology to override the limits of law in the area of criminal
investigation. ' ' 21 1 In Jacobsen, the Court held that federal agents
did not infringe upon any constitutional rights when they reopened
and tested a white powdery substance that was contained within a
tube that was secreted within a damaged box.2 32 Finding that the

.10 in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See InsuranceInstitutefor Highway Safety Highway Loss Data Institute, DUIIDWI Laws, at http://www.highwaysafety.org/-

safety-facts/statelaws/dui.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). In Alabama,
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington, the per se level of
intoxication is a blood alcohol content of .08. Id. Massachusetts does not have
a per se law, but a blood alcohol content of .08 is considered evidence of alcohol
impairment. Id.
229 Among the technology that is now being used by the law enforcement
officials are thermal imaging devices to detect marijuana growth inside a home,
passive millimeter wave imaging devices to detect concealed weapons, a gas
chromotograph device known as the Sentor to detect drugs, and face-mapping
computer technology to check for terrorists.
230 See supra Part I.A.l.a. for a detailed discussion on the diminution of

Fourth Amendment protections an individual enjoys in their automobile.
23 466 U.S. 109, 137 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 120.
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search did not impede any legitimate expectation of privacy, the
Court held that opening the package and the subsequent testing of
the white substance did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment.233 The Court further reasoned that, although there
was a warrantless seizure, the seizure was reasonable.2 34 Disagreeing with the majority, Justice Brennan argued that the
determination of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy was
violated turns on the context in which an item is concealed and not
on the identity of the concealed item.235 He further suggested
that, under the majority's approach, there would be no bar to the
use of a device that could detect from afar whether an individual
was carrying contraband.236 Optimistically, however, he suggested
that the Court "stands ready to prevent this Orwellian world from
coming to pass. ,,231 Unfortunately, this does not appear to be
likely.23 s As such, the Supreme Court needs to step in and rule
that the use of the Sniffer is unconstitutional.
III. POLICY GUIDELINE PROPOSALS - A DIFFERENT APPROACH
Assuming, arguendo, and given the likelihood that the use of
the Sniffer will be considered constitutional, there should be
procedures guiding officers in using this tool at sobriety checkpoints. Primarily, the P.A.S. III should not be used on every driver
that is stopped. Prior to its use, the officer should have an independent basis for believing that the driver is intoxicated. This will
ensure against arbitrariness in application.
In addition, the driver should be informed by the officer that he
is about to be tested, and be given an opportunity to consent to its
233

Id. at 120, 123.

234

Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 138.
Id. ("Fortunately, we know from precedents such as Katz v. United States,

235
236

237

overruling the 'trespass' doctrine of Goldman v. United States, and Olmstead v.
United States, that this Court ultimately stands ready to prevent this Orwellian
world from coming to pass.").
238 However, the Supreme Court is set to rule on the constitutionality of the
use of thermal imaging devices. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th
Cir. 1999) cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 29 (2000) (No. 99-8508).
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use. If the Sniffer is used, police officers should be careful in not
requesting testimonial information from the driver. As such, the
usual questions that are asked at a sobriety checkpoint 239 should
not be asked because they will in effect put the driver in a trilemma24° even if the driver does not know it at the time. 4'
There are also several other approaches that can be taken in
dealing with the use of the P.A.S. III. One approach is for the
Supreme Court to reconsider its analysis of the constitutionality of
dog sniffs. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court could
acknowledge that a dog sniff constitutes a search and utilize a
different type of analysis. 242 In Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Place - Dog Sniffs - Ten Years Later, Hope

Walker Hall suggests that "[t]he point is not to exclude the use of
dogs, but rather to regulate their use by acknowledging the relative
interests of the individual and government."243 This balancing
test, which the Court has already applied to the constitutionality of
operating roadblocks, could also be used to determine the constitutionality of the use of dogs to sniff for drugs in various situations.
Hall suggests that the expectation of privacy in the area searched
should be balanced against the legitimate need for the intrusion."' This, in turn, would result in different levels of justification being required for different levels of intrusion.245 Thus, the
expectation of privacy in the interior of an automobile, when
balanced against the need to use the P.A.S. III to determine
intoxication, could lead to a requirement of an articulable suspicion
of intoxication prior to the use of the P.A.S. III on a driver.246

239 Questions such as "How much have you had to drink tonight?" or "Have
you been drinking?"
240 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
241 Since the Sniffer is hidden, the driver may often not know that the

Sniffer has been used and detected alcohol.
242 See Hope Walker Hall, Comment, Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment:
United States v. Place - Dog Sniffs - Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L. REv. 151, 185
(1994).
243
244
245
246

Id.
id.
id.
Id.
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Since the Court did not have to decide the issue of canine sniffs
in Place,24 7 the Court's discussion of canine sniffs could be
considered dicta. As such, the Court could arguably still revisit the
issue. However, the Court's latest decision in Indianapolis v.
Edmond, while not decided based on the use of drug detection
dogs, suggests that the Court will not reconsider the issue and rule
that the use of the dog constitutes a search. 248
Another approach, suggested by Professor Thomas Clancy, is
to reassess the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 249 According to Professor Clancy, the Fourth Amendment was intended to,
and should be read to, protect security, which, in turn is defined as
the right to exclude government agents from unreasonable intrusion. 250 This Fourth Amendment right to exclude is not limited
in application to "persons, houses, papers and effects, 251 but,
instead, also applies to protecting non-physical, intangible interests.252
Professor Clancy further argues that "[a] normative liberal
approach is particularly necessary in today's world, where
technology threatens to make all the details of one's life detectable. 253 Noting that "[p]ermitting the use of sensory enhancing
devices encourages extraordinary efforts and technological4
25
innovation to defeat the ability to exclude the government.,
Clancy argues that "[r]ather than making arbitrary decisions to
differentiate among efforts made to keep secrets or among the
effects of various technological devices, the inquiry [should focus
on] the essence of what the amendment seeks to protect - the right
to exclude others from prying., 255 This inquiry would lead to a
determination of whether "the precautions taken by the person
247

462 U.S. 696 (1983).

248

121 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2000). "The fact that officers walk a narcotics-

detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does
not transform the seizure into a search." Id.
249 See Clancy, supra note 21.
250 See Clancy, supra note 21, at 350-52.
251 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
252 Clancy, supra note 21, at 355.
253
254
255

Clancy, supra note 21, at 364.
Clancy, supra note 21, at 365.
Clancy, supra note 21, at 365.
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objectively evidence an intent to exclude the human senses";
whether "the particular surveillance technique utilized by the
government defeat the individual's right to exclude"; and whether
"the 'spirit motivating the framers' of the amendment 'abhor these
new devices no less' than the 'direct and obvious methods of
25 6
oppression' that inspired the Fourth Amendment.,
Utilizing Professor Clancy's inquiry, the use of the P.A.S. III
would likely intrude on an individual's right to be secure. 7
Arguably, where the car windows are rolled up, there is an intent
to exclude human senses. Furthermore, the use of the checkpoint
requiring an individual to stop and to roll down the car windows
to talk to the police defeats the individual's right to exclude.
Finally, the use of the Sniffer to detect the undetectable invades a
person's privacy to determine guilt in a manner that is no less
abhorrent than a "direct and obvious method of oppression." As
such, Professor Clancy's inquiry suggests that the use of the P.A.S.
III would be unconstitutional.258
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decisions in the Fourth Amendment line
of search and seizure cases unfortunately suggest that there is an
increasingly smaller sphere of privacy to which an individual is
entitled. In fact, there appears to be only a small, ever decreasing
expectation of privacy rights in automobiles that the Supreme Court
is willing to recognize as existing. While it is necessary for the
court to balance the competing interests of law enforcement and
individual privacy, such a balance should not consistently be struck
in favor of law enforcement at the expense of individual privacy.
Without a doubt, in this day and age of using technology in the
commission of crimes, effective law enforcement necessitates
allowing the police similar access to devices created by the
advances in technology. However, considerations of increased
invasions into individual privacy should not be considered lightly.
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Technological advances are threatening the individual right to
be free from governmental intrusions. Furthermore, technological
advances and the increasing use of devices such as the Sniffer
appear to be leading the Supreme Court back to a diminished
notion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. With the exception
of certain eavesdropping devices, the Court has managed to evade
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment's proscriptions and allow a
continuing infringement on an individual's privacy. The time has
come for the Supreme Court to draw the line and stop chipping
away further at individual rights. If it does not, the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
will cease to have any real practical meaning.

